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Abstract
Since Clark and Chalmers proposed the extended mind thesis (EMT), philosophers have been holding intensive discussions on
this topic. EMT is closely related with the concept of mind, scientific methodologies on the mental, and understanding of 
cognitive science. The science of extended mind is a new research program in the cognitive science that is opposed to the view of 
the traditional cognitive science. In this paper, we show a shortcoming of the original EMT and propose an ontological
clarification of EMT. For this purpose, we take a four-dimensional ontology and define a notion of extended agent based on this
ontology. Then, we analyze problems of EMT using this notion. Through these discussions, we clarify the relationship between
the brain-centered view and the view of EMT.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Universiti Malaysia Sarawak
Keywords: extended mind; extended agent; science of extended cognition; four-dimensional mereology
1. Introduction
The philosophy of mind and cognitive science started with an assumption that the body and the mind can be
clearly separated. Recently, many researchers become skeptical about this assumption. From the evolutional
viewpoint, both the brain and the body found an optimal unified construction through a hard struggle for existence.
In the past 10 years, empirical research on embodied cognition is explored [23]. In parallel with this development, a 
new viewpoint of philosophy of mind is proposed by Clark and Chalmers [8]. This is the view of the extended mind.
This paper aims a close examination of their thesis.
2. The Extended Mind Thesis
Since Clark and Chalmers proposed EMT [8], philosophers and theorists in the cognitive science have been
holding intensive discussions on this topic [5,6,1,11,19]. In this section, at first, we describe Clark's
characterizations of EMT.
2.1. The traditional cognitive science and the science of extended mind
For our discussion in this paper, it will be helpful to shortly illustrate the view of the traditional cognitive science
(TCS). According to TCS, the brain plays an essential role for performing mental activities. TCS tends to
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understand the mind using the model of computer metaphor. For example, TCS interprets sensory information as 
input for the brain and considers that bodily movements are caused by control commands sent from the brain. 
Additionally, TCS considers the body and the environment as peripheral to understanding the nature of mind and 
cognition. In other words, TCS has conceptualized central cognitive processing in abstraction from bodily 
mechanisms of sensory processing and motor control [23: sect. 1]. This position corresponds to the following view 
that Clark calls BRAINBOUND: "[ ] the (nonneural) body is just the sensor and effector system of the brain, and 
the rest of the world is just the arena in which adaptive problems get posed and in which the brain-body system must 
sense and act. [ ] all human cognition depends directly on neural activity alone. [ ] All that really matters as far 
as the actual mechanisms of human cognition are concerned is what goes on in the brain" [6: pg. xxvii]. 
A research program that is opposed to this brain-centered view is the embodied cognitive science (ECS). 
According to ECS, the cognition is deeply dependent upon features of the physical body of an agent and aspects of 
the agent's body other than the brain and the body plays a significant causal or physically constructive role in 
cognitive processing [23: sect. 1]. The cognitive developmental robotics (CDR) could be considered as a part of 
ECS. In order to analyze developmental interactions between body and cognitive capacities, CDR employs 
computer simulations and experiments involving robots instead of standard psychological experiments with humans 
[2].  
EMT is also opposed to BRAINBOUND. The science of extended mind (SEM) includes ECS and adds to it a 
further claim about agent's interaction with parts of the world. Clark characterizes this position as follows (He calls 
this position EXTENDED): "[ ] thinking and cognizing may (at times) depend directly and noninstrumentally 
upon the ongoing work of the body and / or the extraorganismic environment. [ ] the actual local operations that 
realize certain forms of human cognizing include inextricable tangles of feedback, feed-forward, and feed-around 
loops: loops that promiscuously criss-cross the boundaries of brain, body, and world. The local mechanisms of 
mind, if this is correct, are not all in the head. Cognition leaks out into body and world" [6: pg. xxviii]. 
According to SEM, cognitive activities cannot be clearly separated from brain's interaction with the body and the 
world. Thus, the approach of BRAINBOUND is misleading, because many of our cognitive activities involve not 
only our brains but also our bodies and parts of the world. Cognitive systems themselves extend beyond the 
boundary of the individual organism [23: sect. 1]. 
2.2. The first example for EMT 
To clarify the view of EMT, let us consider two examples provided by Clark and Chalmers. The first example is 
a story about Otto who suffers from Alzheimer's disease [8: pg.12-16] [6: pg.226-227]. The following is a 
compressed version of this story [6: pg.78] [7]. 
Inga hears of an intriguing exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA) in New York. She thinks, 
recalls it's on 53rd Street and sets off. Otto suffers from a mild form of Alzheimer's, and as a result he 
always carries a thick notebook. When Otto learns useful new information, he always writes it in the 
notebook. He hears of the exhibition at MOMA, retrieves the address from his trusty notebook, and sets 
off. Just like Inga, we claimed, Otto walked to 53rd Street because he wanted to go to the museum and 
believed (even before consulting the notebook) that it was on 53rd Street. The functional poise of the 
stored information was, in each case, sufficiently similar (we argued) to warrant similarity of treatment. 
Otto's long-term beliefs just weren't all in his head. 
As this description shows, EMT claims that not only Inga but also Otto knew, even before consulting his 
notebook, where MOMA was. EMT concludes, then, that Otto's mind includes his notebook. To justify this 
conclusion, Clark and Chalmers propose the following Parity Principle. 
[Parity Principle] If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it to 
go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive process, then that part 
of the world is (for that time) part of the cognitive process [6: pg.77]. 
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According to this principle, Otto's notebook is a part of Otto's mind and it plays the similar cognitive role like a 
part of Inga's brain. In other words, with respect to the knowledge about MOMA's address, Otto's notebook works 
as functionally equivalent with a part of Inga's brain. 
Many philosophers, even theorists who accept EMT, would ask themselves how far the mind can be extended. 
Clark and Chalmers [8] propose, therefore, additional four criteria that justify ascriptions of an extended belief [8: 
pg.17] [6: pg.231]. Clark generalizes these criteria, so that we can apply them generally to nonbiological candidates 
as criteria for inclusion into an individual cognitive system [6: pg.79]. 
[Criteria for inclusion into an individual cognitive system] 
(1a) The resource should be reliably available and typically invoked. (Otto always carries the notebook 
and won't answer that he "doesn't know" until after he has consulted it.) 
(1b) Any information thus retrieved should be more or less automatically endorsed. It should not usually 
be subject to critical scrutiny (e.g., unlike the opinions of other people). It should be deemed about as 
trustworthy as something retrieved clearly from biological memory. 
(1c) Information contained in the resource should be easily accessible as and when required.  
(1d) The information in the notebook has been consciously endorsed at some point in the past and indeed 
is there as a consequence of this endorsement.   
However, some opponents proposed a strong and persuading argument against EMT that is called "the Otto 2-
step": All Otto actually believes (in advance) is that the address is in the notebook. That's the belief (Step 1) that 
leads to the looking (step 2) that then leads to the (new) belief about the actual street address [6: pg.80]. 
According to this Otto 2-step, we cannot say that Otto believed, before consulting the notebook, that MOMA was 
on 53rd Street. For it was just after consulting his notebook that Otto was led to this belief. However, Clark thinks 
that this objection can be rejected by criterion (1b), because "calls to the notebook are as deeply and subpersonally 
integrated into his problem-solving routines" [6: pg.80]. Well, is this answer really persuading? The restriction by 
(1b) might be too strong so that some interesting cases are excluded from application of EMT. We will reconsider 
this problem in section 3.2 of this paper. 
2.3. The second example for EMT 
Our second example is taken from a famous exchange between the Nobel Prize-winning physicist Richard 
Feynman and the historian Charles Weiner. In an interview with Feynman, Weiner made a remark on Feynman s 
original notes and sketches and said that the materials represented "a record of [Feynman's] day-to-day work." Then, 
Feynman responded to this question: "I actually did the work on the paper". Clark interprets this episode as follows: 
Feynman's suggestion is, at the very least, that the loop into the external medium was integral to his intellectual 
activity [ ] itself. But I would like to go further and suggest that Feynman was actually thinking on the paper. The 
loop through pen and paper is part of the physical machinery responsible for the shape of the flow of thoughts and 
ideas that we take, nonetheless to be distinctively those of Richard Feynman. It reliably and robustly provides a 
functionality which, were it provided by going-on in the head alone, we would have no hesitation in designating as 
part of the cognitive circuitry [6: pg. xxv]. 
In Otto's example, his standing belief of MOMA's place is something that is normally realized without any help 
of a notebook. Oppositely, in this second example, the external resource in question plays an essential and inevitable 
role for the realization of the given cognitive task. Without writing some information on a paper and without 
combining different pieces of information registered on it, the fulfillment of the cognitive task in question would 
have been unachievable. 
As a similar but more familiar example, let us think about a multiplication of two large numbers, say 84632 and 
346. Because the performance of this multiplication contains several complex subtasks, the capacity of the working 
memory of ordinary people is not large enough for keeping the intermediate results of all calculation steps in mind 
(For the limitation of the capacity of working memory, see Baddeley [3]). By the way, also Clark uses an example 
of multiplication [4]. So, we usually write down each result of the intermediate multiplication steps on a paper, after 
that we add the numbers in these steps, and finally we get the calculation result (See Fig. 1). 
Now, this activity does not seem to satisfy condition (1b). For we deliberately (not automatically) use a paper for 
complex calculations. This kind of complex calculation essentially requires the help of external resources. It seems 
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that the Parity Principle provides no good explanation for these kinds of examples. At least, the applicability of this 
principle depends very much on the subjective judgment about acceptability of the given counterfactual situation. 
Fig. 1.  An example of a performance of multiplication 
84632 
       346   
25389600   84632  300 
3385280   84632  40  
      507792   84632  6 
29282672   25399600 + 2385280 + 507792 
3. Extended Agents and The Extended Mind  
In this section, we propose a new interpretation of the extended mind, namely we interpret the extended mind as 
the mind of an extended agent. When we take this approach, we are led to accept double interpretations of the mind, 
namely an interpretation of the mind as the mind of an atomic agent and another interpretation of the mind as the 
mind of an extended agent (that includes the atomic agent as the core). Both interpretations are equally acceptable. 
As a result, we cannot simply decide if EMT is right or not. 
3.1. The second example for EMT 
Our interpretation of extended agent is based on the four-dimensional mereology that is a framework proposed in 
[13]. About the four-dimensionalism and the mereology, you may consult Sider [20], Nakayama [12], and Varzi 
[22]. The mereology is a formal framework for parthood relation that is originally developed by Leonard and 
Goodman [9]. In this paper, we do not describe the formalism of four-dimensionalism in detail. Here, it will be 
enough only to mention that a four-dimensionalist considers a physical entity as spatiotemporally extended and that 
this ontological view justifies for us using the notion temporal part of (four-dimensional) objects. We need this 
formalism, because we propose to interpret extended agents as four-dimensional objects that exist only for certain 
amount of time, where we understand under agent an entity that can deliberately perform actions. That means, we 
may ascribe mental states and mental processes to an agent in order to explain the reason for his action. In this 
paper, we accept not only atomic agents but also extended agents. For example, when Feynman used a pen to 
calculate on a notebook in time interval t, we can say that the temporal part of Feynman in t + the temporal part of 
his pen in t + the temporal part of his notebook in t is calculating, where + means (four-dimensional) mereological 
sum. In general, the notion of extended agent can be recursively defined as follows (This definition is a refined 
version of the definition given in [14]). 
[Definition of extended agent] 
(2a) [Atomic Agent] An atomic agent is an agent. Any spatial part of an atomic agent is no agent. Here, 
we simply presuppose that there are atomic agents. An atomic agent constitutes the core (or one of 
cores) of any extended agent. 
(2b) [Agents and Tools] Let temporal-part (x, t) denote the temporal part of object x in time t. Let A be an 
agent that uses (tool) B in time t to perform an action. Then, the (four-dimensional) mereological sum, 
temporal-part (A, t) + temporal-part (B, t), is an agent. By the way, we can easily prove within the 
four-dimensional mereology that temporal-part (A+B, t) = temporal-part (A, t) + temporal-part (B, t). 
(2c) [Collective Agent] If agents A1 An perform a joint action, then  A1 An is an agent (For the 
notion of joint action, see [21]). 
(2d) If an object satisfies neither (2a) nor (2b) nor (2c), then it is no agent. 
(2e) [Extended Agent] An agent that is not atomic is called an extended agent. 
A typical example of atomic agents is an individual person (See (2a)). An example of extended agents is a person 
A with a hammer B when he is hitting a nail with it (formally expressed, temporal-part (A+B, time of action t). See 
(2b) and (2e)). Also, a group of three people, C, D, and E, who are carrying a piano (formally expressed, temporal-
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part (C+D+E, time of action t)) is an extended agent (See (2c) and (2e)). In this case, we can ascribe a shared 
intention to the collective agent composed of these three people. Because the above definition allows a complex 
hierarchy, a quite complex system could be an extended agent. 
Here, we point out an obscurity in the Party Principle introduced in section 2.2. This principle contains the 
following phrase "that part of the world is (for that time) part of the cognitive process" [6: pg.77]. In this sentence, 
Clark uses the word "part" twice. However, what does Clark mean with this word? Is the part of the world a three-
dimensional or a four-dimensional object? Is the cognitive process a four-dimensional entity? How can an object (= 
that part of the world) be a part of a process? In this way, we can form many questions about ontological status. The 
sentence is certainly not nonsense, but it is heavily ambiguous in the sense that it can be interpreted in many 
different ways. To vanish this obscurity, the sentence "that part of the world is (for that time) part of the cognitive 
process" in the principle should be replaced by the sentence "temporal-part (that part of the world, that time) is 
(four-dimensional) part of the cognitive process". 
When Otto writes down a piece of new information in his notebook, he probably uses a pen. In this case, we 
usually simply say, "Otto writes down a piece of new information in his notebook in time interval t", because it is 
obvious for us that Otto used a writing tool and because this information is usually uninteresting for us. Thus, when 
we want to be precise, we should say, "temporal-part (Otto + his pen, t) writes down a piece of new information in 
his notebook". 
3.2. The extended mind thesis, revisited 
In section 3.1, we introduced the notion of extended agent. In this section, we point out that mental properties can 
be ascribed not only to atomic agents but also to extended agents (We assume here that mental states and mental 
processes belong to mental properties. By the way, the discussion in this subsection is partly based on [16]). Our 
proposal contains a slight modification of the original EMT. Thereby, we emphasize the physicalist view (See (3d)). 
We interpret, here, the mind not as a thing but explicitly as a state or a process that is ascribed to an agent. 
(3a) When A is an extended agent and A is performing an action, we sometimes ascribe mental processes 
to A. 
(3b) We sometimes ascribe mental states to extended agents, when certain conditions are satisfied. 
(3c) The conditions for adequate ascriptions of properties to extended agents involve the context 
dependency. 
(3d) [Supervenience Thesis] Mental properties of an agent supervene upon his physical properties. This 
means that a difference in mental properties of an agent implies differences in his physical properties 
(For notion supervenience, see [10]). This supervenience thesis holds not only for atomic agents but 
also for extended agents.  
Based on this observation, let us consider some ascriptions of belief states and mental processes to atomic and 
extended agents. Let t0 be a time interval in which Ingo decides to go to MOMA. Let t1 be a time interval just before 
Otto consulted the notebook and t2 be a time interval just after he consulted the notebook. Furthermore, let t3 be a 
time interval in which Feynman is writing a calculation in his notebook. Then, using four-dimensional descriptions, 
the examples discussed in section 2 can be described as follows. 
[Four-dimensional descriptions of mind of agents] 
(4a) temporal-part (Inga, t0) believes that MOMA is on 53rd Street.  
(4b) temporal-part (Otto + his notebook, t1) believes that MOMA is on 53rd Street. 
(4c) temporal-part (Otto + his notebook, t2) believes that MOMA is on 53rd Street. 
(4d) temporal-part (Otto, t1) believes that the address of MOMA is written in his notebook. 
(4e) temporal-part (Otto, t1) does not believe that MOMA is on 53rd Street. 
(4f) temporal-part (Otto, t2) believes that MOMA is on 53rd Street. 
(4g) temporal-part (Feynman + his pen + his notebook, t3) is thinking 
(4h) temporal-part (Feynman, t3) is performing a partial task of thinking 
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In these descriptions, Inga, Otto, and Feynman are interpreted as atomic agents, while temporal-part (Otto + his 
notebook, t1) and temporal-part (Feynman + his pen + his notebook, t3) are interpreted as extended agents. For 
example, (4a) ascribes a belief about MOMA's place to the temporal part of Inga in t1, while (4b) ascribes the same 
belief to the temporal part of the fusion of Otto and his notebook in t1, According to this interpretation, the extended 
mind in this case is identified with the mind of the temporal part of the fusion of Otto and his notebook in t1. Note 
that our interpretation does not ignore the mind of the temporal part of Otto in t1 (See (4d) and (4e)). Instead, we 
accept that both temporal-part (Otto, t1) and temporal-part (Otto + his notebook, t1) desire to go to MOMA. In this 
case, we ascribe this desire to temporal-part (Otto + his notebook, t1) based on the ascription of the desire to 
temporal-part (Otto, t1). However, according to our interpretation, Otto as an atomic agent did not know the place of 
MOMA in t1, while temporal-part (Otto + his notebook, t1) knew it. To clarify the difference between TCS and 
EMT, we describe what kind of commitment TCS, EMT, and our interpretation would take with respect to the 
statements from (4a) to (4h) (See Table 1). 
Sentences from (4d) to (4f) describe belief states in the Otto 2-step (See section 2.2 ). Otto's belief state in the 
first step is described by (4d) and (4e), while his belief state in the second step is described by (4f). Now, you can 
see that we accept the Otto 2-step (you can see in Table 1 that we accept (4d), (4e), and (4f)), but we think that the 
Otto 2-step does not conflict with the modified EMT, which accepts both (4b) and (4c). Especially when we know 
that all conditions from (1a) to (1d) are fulfilled, we have a strong reason to accept (4b) based on (4d). In such a 
case, (4b) can be justified through the plausibility of the conditional "If Otto were asked in t1 where MOMA was, 
then he would consult his notebook and would answer that MOMA was on 53rd Street". 
The original EMT seems to reject (4e), for Clark claimed, "Otto walked to 53rd Street because he wanted to go to 
the museum and believed (even before consulting the notebook) that it was on 53rd Street" [6: pg.78]. When we 
literally translate the central part of this statement into our formalism, we obtain "temporal-part (Otto, t1) believes 
that MOMA is on 53rd Street", which is incompatible with (4e). However, it is unclear what Clark means with the 
symbol "Otto", when he wrote the previously quoted sentence. Did he literally mean Otto as an atomic agent, or did 
he mean somehow loosely Otto as an extended agent, namely as Otto with his notebook? The original EMT is not 
free from this kind of obscurity. 
Note that our concept of extended mind is, in a sense, wider than that of the original EMT. Our concept includes 
also collective mind involving environmental parts of the world, whereas EMT seems to consider only extension of 
individual minds. On the other hand, we accept extended mind not for a permanent duration but only for a temporal 
part (More precisely, an extended mind for a permanent duration is a special case of that for a temporal part). In 
fact, in the original EMT, it is not very clear how Clark and Chalmers want to deal with temporal changes of mental 
properties. 
Table 1. Commitment to ascription of mental states and mental actions 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
3.3. The extended body and the self  
Because the identity of a four-dimensional object is determined by its spatiotemporal occupation, an extended 
agent always coincides with its body. When the aspect of body should be emphasized, I use the term extended body 
instead of extended agent. This term extended body becomes appropriate, when we describe some cases of the 
brain-machine interface (BMI). BMI is a direct communication pathway between the brain and an external device. 
BMIs are often directed at assisting, augmenting, or repairing human cognitive or sensory-motor functions. Let us 
think about patient F who cannot move his own arms and whose brain that is completely intact is connected with a 
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device H that responds to F's brain activities. Furthermore, H is connected with a robot hand G, so that G performs 
the movement that is intended by F. Suppose that F pushes an object J with his robot hand. In this case we can say 
that temporal-part (patient F + robot hand G + binding machine H, t) pushes object J. This would be a good 
example for an extended body. 
As the next example of extended bodies, let us think about a teleoperated android. Ishiguro and his group 
developed androids that are robots whose appearance is very close to humans. They also developed teleoperated 
androids. Using internet connection, an operator K of a teleoperated android L can communicate with visitors who 
are placed in a distant location [18, 17, 15: chap.3].  In this case, we again need a mediating technical device M, 
which consists of video cameras, microphones, computers, monitors, internet devices, and so on.  Here, we can 
analyze a communication situation with a teleoperated android L in three different ways. 
(5a) temporal-part (operator K, t) communicates with visitors. 
(5b) temporal-part (operator K + mediating device M + android L, t) communicates with visitors. 
(5c) temporal-part (android L, t) communicates with visitors. 
All of these three interpretations are principally possible. The answer to the question, which interpretation is the 
right one, depends on the content of the conversation and the given context. According to Ishiguro, we can transfer 
the feeling of presence from a distant location. This observation is supported by interpretation (5c). This problem of 
the feeling of human presence is also related with problems of the self-identification [15: chap.3]. 
3.4. The traditional cognitive science and the science of the extended mind    
From our discussion, we can conclude that we cannot simply say if EMT is right or not. At least, EMT is obscure 
and should be refined. In this paper, we have shown that an atomic agent is, in some cases, a part of an extended 
agent. According to our proposal, we should distinguish between what an atomic agent does and what an extended 
agent does. When an extended agent is performing an action (For the sake of simplicity, we assume here that a 
single atomic agent is involved in this action), activities of the atomic agent are (four-dimensional, i.e., 
spatiotemporal) parts of the whole activity of the extended agent. 
As we know from our ordinary life, a cognitive use of external resources enhances cognitive ability of humans. 
For example, the invention of letters made possible to preserve information in a material medium so that it can be 
conveyed over time. The use of an abacus enabled us to make a calculation with large numbers. In this way, 
inventions of tools have clearly enhanced cognitive capacities of humans as extended agents. 
EMT brought a new viewpoint to the cognitive science. According to this view, achievements of researches in 
TCS are not simply wrong, but they are limited. SEM includes researches in TCS as a part, but additionally it 
investigates interactions among the brain, the body, and the world. Understood in this way, SEM does not simply 
deny TCS, rather it extends the focus of TCS. Clark's understanding of SEM is somehow misleading. SEM may 
positively employ results from TCS under the condition that SEM reinterprets them in a new and wider context. 
4. Conclusions 
An important aspect of human intelligence consists in the ability of using external resources, while TCS tends to 
miss this point. As we sometimes confirmed in this paper, Clark seems to strongly reject TCS. However, in order to 
establish SEM, it is important to investigate behaviors of an extended agent as a whole and to examine what kind of 
cognitive roles the brain plays there. In this respect, our proposal of the modified EMT would be intriguing, because 
it can describe the relationship between the mind of an extended agent and the mind of the atomic agent who works 
as the core of the extended agent. Through clarification of the ontological basis for EMT, we have shown that the 
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